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This paper assesses illegal fishing in West Africa, one of the regions most affected
by Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing (IUU) in the world. The catch, the
economic loss and the amount recovered through Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance
(MCS) are calculated based on a reconstruction method, and the information made
available through national MCS units, between 2010 and 2016 in an effort to assess
the effectiveness of surveillance efforts in the region. Results show considerable loss
of revenues for Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, and Sierra
Leone, estimated at 2.3 billion USD annually, while a minimal amount of 13 million USD
is recovered through MCS. In addition, this paper finds that countries touched by the
Ebola crisis (Guinea and Sierra Leone) drive a tremendous increase in the loss generated
by illegal fishing. However, further analysis shows that the overall severity of illegal fishing,
as defined by a range of types investigated here, declines as the fines against the most
severe forms of IUU fishing increase. Finally this study finds that Sierra Leone and The
Gambia have the highest scoring MCS systems, and were the countries where the most
offenders are caught and charged with the highest fines, while Senegal’s new legislations
which improved MCS during 2015 does not appear to show on the scoring results. This
study finds that illegal fishing amounts the equivalent of 65% of the legal reported catch
from West Africa and poses serious concern for food security, and the economy in the
region.
Keywords: illegal fishing, IUU, catches, West Africa, economic values, sanctions, offenses, Monitoring Control and
Surveillance
INTRODUCTION
There is growing concern with regards to the health of global fish stocks and the repercussions
of their depletion on food security and the economy of most vulnerable countries (FAO, 2016).
West African countries rely heavily on fish as a one of the principal sources of protein, but also
as a source of income and employment for nearly 7 million people (Belhabib et al., 2015c). This
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region has seen its fish stocks decline, driven by over-exploitation,
overcapacity, and illegal fishing (Daniels et al., 2016). Previous
work assessed illegal fishing in the region (Belhabib et al., 2012c,
2016; Belhabib and Pauly, 2015) to nearly 40 per cent of all the
fish caught—the highest level worldwide (Agnew et al., 2009).
Not only the economy of vulnerable countries is threatened,
illegal fishing is estimated to reduce the number of jobs in
artisanal sectors by 300,000 (Daniels et al., 2016). Illegal fishing
conducted by industrial vessels is very difficult to assess and
existing estimates are bound with a high degree of uncertainty,
as illegal fishing vessels are highly mobile and develop tedious
techniques to escape surveillance, particularly that monitoring is
limited in the region.
There are different drivers of illegal fishing, as we look at
industrial fishing, we argue that economic gain is the most
significant incentive (Le Gallic and Cox, 2006; Sumaila et al.,
2006), alongside with the ability of simply doing so (Andrews-
Chouicha and Gray, 2005). This is mainly the case in the national
waters or exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the 6 West African
countries (The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania,
Senegal, and Sierra Leone), whose Monitoring Control and
Surveillance (MCS) systems are relatively weak.
MCS is often bound with country’s indicators such as
governance and corruption (Standing, 2006), which are very
weak in the region. Poor governance and high corruption
combined with high monitoring costs pose a serious concern on
the sustainability of West African countries’ efforts to combat
illegal fishing. Examples in the region show that the presence of
international funders helps combatting illegal fishing by adding
transparency and increasing surveillance activities. This raises the
question of the effectiveness of these systems, and how much
of the loss to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is
recovered through MCS (fines and sanctions).
MCS efforts are further jeopardized by the use of “detection
escape” techniques such as interfering with electronic monitoring
systems, the use of different flags to hide vessel identity and
escape prosecution, use of multiple boat names, and forgery of
registration certificates in the region (J.M. pers. obs.). Several
cases illustrate multiple violations of fishery laws within West
Africa, and raised important attention on the issue of cost
recovery, to allow MCS efforts to become sustainable and
independent from foreign “funding” (MRAG, 2005; Greenpeace,
2006). Multiple infractions and low capability of prosecution
given high rates of detection escape render MCS particularly
vulnerable to lower budgets. This vulnerability limits the ability
of West African countries to deter IUU fishing. In addition,
losses generated by illegal fishing in the region are barely known
which limits knowledge on real economic losses generated by
such activity.
This paper seeks to assess economic loss caused by illegal
fishing in West Africa and the effectiveness of enforcement
in the period between 2010 and 2016. It builds, for the first
time, a sanctions and illegal fishing database, and analyses the
relationship between sanctions and severity of IUU and draws
conclusions on the efforts to make to reduce illegal fishing in the
region. It also discusses the implication of illegal fishing on the
artisanal fisheries sector, food security, and the economy.
METHODS
Study Area
The study area covers six countries (Mauritania, Senegal, The
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, and Sierra Leone). These
countries are members of the West African Sub Regional
Fisheries Commission (SRFC)1 and lay within the Canary
Current Large Marine Ecosystem (CCLME) in the North and
the Guinean Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) in the
South. This makes West African waters particularly productive.
The coastal zone of West Africa is an area of strategic interest
for the socio-economic development and livelihood of 1.4million
people living along the coast, and fisheries therein can contribute
up to 38% of the GDP (Belhabib et al., 2015c).
Building a Comprehensive Database of
Illegal Fishing Vessels, Offenses, and
Sanctions
We investigate illegal fishing occurrences in West Africa and
cover multiple indicators between 2010 and 2016. These are:
Vessel name, gear type, country where illegal fishing occurred
(or country where a fine was issued), origin of the vessel
(flag), amount of the fine paid (or otherwise issued, if not yet
paid) converted into USD2015, year of illegal activity, offenses
committed per vessel, other sanctions in addition to the fine (such
as confiscation of vessel, catch, gear, etc.), and whether a sanction
was issued at all. The main data were gathered from various
media sources, and observations from various organizations
(Environmental Justice Foundation, 2012; INTERPOL, 2014;
Greenpeace, 2016a,b), complemented by information from the
Department of Surveillance and Protection of Fisheries for
Senegal, TheMCS units of The Gambia, Sierra Leone andGuinea,
and theMinistry of Fisheries of Guinea Bissau, while information
for Mauritania were not available. In cases where sanctions were
not reported (notably the case of Guinea and Guinea Bissau), the
amount of the sanction was assumed to equate the minimum
amount that is given under the Fisheries Act of the country for
that offense, or the average based on the most recent historical
fine amounts available for similar cases.
Estimation of Illegal Catches
We estimated illegal catches, i.e., catches by foreign fleets as
per the definition of illegal fishing (Belhabib et al., 2014a) for
each country following different approaches depending on data
availability.
Senegal
Illegal catches for Senegal for the years 2010 and 2011 were
extracted from Belhabib et al. (2014a) and were estimated based
on the number of observed illegal fishing boats, their size and a
modeled catch per unit of effort (Belhabib et al., 2014b). Given
similar MCS efforts between 2011 and 2012, we assumed illegal
catches were constant then, and they increased by 20% between
2012 and 2013 after the dismissal of the Russian vessels from
Senegalese waters (Belhabib et al., 2014a, 2015a). This particularly
applied after Russian vessels obtained licenses in other countries
1Cape Verde, also a member, is not included in this analysis.
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in the sub-region (notably, Guinea Bissau and Mauritania), as
incursions to Senegalese waters at night were common (A.G. pers.
observation). We then multiplied the illegal catch of 2013 by the
variation between 2013 and 2014, and between 2014 and 2015
to estimate the illegal catch for 2014 and 2015. Variation rates
were derived from the percentage of infractions (compared to
the total observed vessels) found in the World Bank monitoring
report (The World Bank, 2016). Fishing vessels observed by
aerial/surface patrol or by radar and satellite monitoring that are
committing a serious infraction in targeted fisheries represented
86% of the total in 2013, 60% in 2014, and 60% in 2015 (The
World Bank, 2016).
Guinea Bissau
Two data points were available for Guinea Bissau. Surveillance
activities found eight vessels fishing illegally during 1 week in
2014 (Caopa and Rejprao, 2016). Given the conservative nature
of this estimate, we extrapolated year long and estimated a
number of 52 vessels in 2014. This number was multiplied by a
CPUE of 1,200 t•boat−1•year−1, which is theminimum an illegal
trawler catches to cover its operation costs (Pauly et al., 2014;
Belhabib et al., 2015b). We assumed the illegal catch was constant
between 2014 and 2015 and interpolated linearly between the
estimate in 2010 (18,000 t), provided by Belhabib and Pauly
(2015) for Guinea Bissau.
Guinea
Illegal fishing in Guinea represents the equivalent of 64% of legal
reported catches (Belhabib et al., 2012a). We first extracted the
estimated illegal catch for Guinea from Belhabib et al. (2012a),
and then multiplied the reported catch extracted from the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) FishStat database, by 64%.
Then we extrapolated the trend forwards to 2015.
Sierra Leone
The number of vessels spotted fishing illegally, or estimated, was
reported at 30 for 20112, 10 in 20123 (Finch, 2016), 7 in 2014
(NOAA, 2015), and 80 in 20154 associated with the Ebola crisis.
The Ebola crisis along with governance issues related to the
cancelation of the World Bank project, a major contributor to
the increase in MCS in 2012 and 2013, prompted low to virtually
no monitoring after 2014. We interpolated the number of boats
between 2012 and 2014 and thenmultiplied by aminimumCPUE
of 446 t•boat−1•year−1 for the industrial fleet operating in Sierra
Leone (Seto et al., 2015).
We note that the number of arrests does not imply the total
number of illegal fishing vessels. Given that 10 vessels were
reported as committing 252 acts of illegal fishing, these numbers
are likely very conservative.
Mauritania and the Gambia
The baseline illegal catch for Mauritania and The Gambia was
extracted from Belhabib et al. (2012b) and Belhabib et al. (2016),
respectively. These were then multiplied by the regional trend
2http://slconcordtimes.com/60-illegal-fishing-in-salone-waters/
3http://blogs.ubc.ca/jdmayer/2014/11/20/from-cannons-to-canon-sinking-
pirate-fishing-in-sierra-leone/
4http://cocorioko.info/now-it-is-time-for-sierra-leone-to-turn-attention
estimated using the total catch for Senegal, Guinea, Guinea
Bissau, and Sierra Leone.
Estimation of Unreported Foreign Catches
To estimate unreported catches by the foreign fleets legally
operating in West Africa, we first estimated the total catch
based on the product of the fishing effort (defined as the
number of vessels, their GRT, the number of fishing days and
their nationality and gear type), and the catch corresponding
to that unit of effort (Belhabib et al., 2014a). The number of
foreign vessels operating in Senegal, The Gambia, Sierra Leone,
Guinea Bissau, and Mauritania were obtained from national
governmental organizations during a workshop in 2016, verified
and/or complemented with the number of foreign vessels legally
operating in the region obtained from official records (e.g., FAO
global fishing vessel database5) whenever available completed by
a literature review (Anon, 2015). The foreign catch from Guinea
was extracted as a sub-set of the total catch, to which an under-
reporting rate of 20% was applied (Belhabib et al., 2012c). The
difference between the reported foreign catch (extracted from
official statistics provided by MCS units whenever available) and
the total estimated catch represents the unreported foreign catch,
which is obtained by flag for Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone,
and Mauritania.
Economic Loss
The annual economic loss caused by illegal and unreported
fishing was estimated by multiplying the estimated illegal and
unreported catch by the ex-vessel price. Ex-vessel prices were
obtained from the Sea Around Us ex-vessel price database for
2010 (Swartz et al., 2013) and converted to 2015 USD using
Consumer Price Index extracted from the World Bank database
(www.worldbank.org).
Although conservative, the values of unregulated catches
were also added. The unregulated catch was estimated using
the number of vessels that were caught while committing an
unregulated fishing act such as illegal transshipment, fishing in
a prohibited zone, using illegal mesh size, etc. multiplied by the
minimum regional CPUE of 446 t•boat−1•year−1 (Seto et al.,
2015). This provides a rather highly conservative estimate since
only those who were caught are taken into consideration in the
analysis.
Assessing the Effectiveness of MCS Using
a Scoring System
Sumaila et al. (2006) describe expected penalty drivers (or
cheating drivers) as closely related to the effectiveness and
efficiency of the surveillance system, the level of non-
governmental or private organizations involvement in detecting
offenses, which relate to the likelihood of vessels of being
detected; avoidance activities of offenders; and the severity
of the penalty which disincentivises illegal fishing when it is
accompanied by effective enforcement. Herein, we look at these
drivers which are the likelihood of vessels of being detected
through the number of offenses and sanctions, the avoidance
activities which are represented by the number of offenses
5http://www.fao.org/figis/vrmf/finder/search/#.V9BNKfkrKM9
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that escape sanctions and the severity of the penalty. We add
availability of information as a proxy for transparency and
develop a scoring system based on the indicators below:
1) Average fine amount: The weighted average fine amount
was calculated for every country and normalized by the
maximum amount (The Gambia) to a scale of 5, where 5 is
the best score and 1 the worst. This indicator illustrates the
severity of the sanction.
2) Number of fined offenders in contrast to the number of
total offenders: This indicates the number of vessels that get
effectively fined over the total. This indicator is normalized
to a scale of 5, where 5 is the best score and 1 is the worst.
This indicator illustrates avoidance.
3) Categories of offenses effectively fined: This indicator
illustrates the frequency of vessels of being detected and
fined, and ranges between 0 and 23.
4) Catch value per shelf unit: This indicator represents the
concentration of the illegal catch, i.e., the amount of fish
caught illegally per square km of continental shelf area. This
indicator is a proxy for the severity of illegal fishing per
country. This was calculated by first dividing the average
value of the illegal catch (2010–2014) by the shelf area for
each country, transformed to a log scale then reversed. We
then normalized the value to a scale of 5.
5) Availability of information: This parameter captures
transparency while dealing with illegal fishing, as high
transparency reduced bribing and corruption. This indicator
is calculated as the sum of 6 sub-parameters scored with
1 for good and 0 for bad: (1) Names of offenders (vessels)
available from government records, (2) fines available from
government or any other sources, (3) offense category or
type available from government or any other sources, (4)
information is not aggregated in such a way that masks paid
fines and offenses, (5) information is easy to obtain upon
request and finally, (6) information is publically available.
The scale of this indicator is between 0 and 6.
The total score is then calculated as the sum of the previous
scores, where the maximum score is 44 (based on the sum of the
maximum of each score).
RESULTS
Illegal Fishing Activities and Sanctions
Overall, there were 2306 observed offenses which spread over 23
offense categories, or observed offenses that have been detected
and mostly sanctioned in the region (Table 1). Around one third
of the offenses observed were not sanctioned. Under-reporting of
fishing effort (associated with GRT) represents themost recurrent
offense. However, this offense is only sanctioned 19% of the
time, while it remains undetected by the governments of West
Africa the rest of the time. Only Senegal applied sanctions on
12 vessels of Chinese origin of around $1,000 US each. Gear
related offenses (associated with illegal mesh size, illegal gear,
improper stowage of fishing gear, etc.) were caught 44 times
6We don’t obtained information from all countries.
TABLE 1 | Summary of observed offenses in West Africa, 2009–2016.
Offense Number
Under-reporting of fishing effort 63
Gear related offense 44
Fishing in a prohibited zone 43
Fishing without a license 19
Forgery-marking default 17
Unauthorized entry or exit to or from EEZ 16
Fishing without an authorization 14
Mistreatment- corruption-failure to comply 14
Absence of an observer onboard 9
Under-reporting of fishing catch 9
Administrative delays caused arrest 8
Illegal trans-shipment 8
Absence of national crew onboard 7
Technical negligence 6
Absence of proper documentation onboard 5
Change of target species 3
VMS-AIS default 3
Prohibited species or juveniles 2
Failure to land catch 2
Illegal discard 1
Failure to pay fees 1
Sanitary and health issues 1
Violating fishing regulations/unspecified 41
overall and were sanctioned entirely, with an average fine of
$137,000 US ranging between $835 US (Senegal) and $812,000
US (The Gambia). Fishing in a prohibited zone ranks third with
43 instances and sanctioned 50% of the time only, with an average
fine of $134,000 US, driven by high sanctions in Sierra Leone.
Registered vessels fishing without a license were caught 19 times
and were fined $179,260 US on average, with an average fine of
$45,000 US in Senegal (the minimum) and a maximum in The
Gambia ($1.1 million US). Forgery of documents, vessel names
and marking fault were severely sanctioned in Sierra Leone
with an average fine of $302,000 US per offense in comparison
with Guinea’s average ($30,000 US) and Senegal ($800 US).
Unauthorized entry to or exit from the EEZ of Sierra Leone
constituted the sixth offense that was most caught in the region,
and was sanctioned with a fine of $55,100 US on average. Fishing
without an authorization ranks seventh and was caught 14 times.
Sanctions for this offense vary greatly from withdrawal of fishing
license and a fine of $800 US (Senegal) to around $2.3 million US
(Senegal). The next most recurrent categories of offenses consist
of mistreatment (of fishing observers), attempted corruption
and/or failure to comply with 14 vessels and an average fine of
$95,600 US per sanction driven by high sanctions in Sierra Leone.
Value Recovered through MCS (Total
Sanctions)
Over the period between 2009 and mid-2016, around $29 million
US were collected or sanctioned in fines.
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Total fines collected or to be collected have increased overall
from less than $370,000 US in 2009 to a projected $13.8 million
US in 2016 (Figure 1). In contrast, the average fine per sanction
has decreased, from the first peak in 2010 ($362,000 US) to
$137,000 US in 2016 (Figure 1). This corresponds to the increase
in the number of offenses (Figure 2). However, the number of
offenses not related to fishing without authorization, such as
entry or exit to or from EEZ without authorization, or gear type
related offenses have increased which contributed to decrease the
average sanction amount per sanction (Figure 1).
Overall, the number of caught offenses increased prompting
an increase in the total amount recovered, from as low as 2
observed offenses in 2009 to 78 in 2014, declined to 43 observed
offenses in 2015, caused by the low MCS in Sierra Leone and
Guinea during the Ebola crisis (Figure 2), and then increased to
a projected 98 caught offenders in 20167 (Figure 2).
Comparing the profile of fines per offense in each country
allows a better understanding of the effectiveness of the legislative
background allowing MCS to recover its operating costs. Hence,
both the number of sanctions (or caught offenders) and the
average sanction amount are important. The highest number of
offenses occurred in Guinea Bissau and Guinea, however the
sanction is either low or not enforced (when observed by anNGO
for example) with on average $24,900 US per offense in Guinea
and $81,800 US in Guinea Bissau and a cumulated number of
offenses of 109 and 72, respectively. In comparison, The Gambia
has the lowest number of caught offenders (11), however charges
the highest amount per offense ($395,000 US), and more efforts
need to focus on MCS to effectively sanction the offenders.
Senegal and Sierra Leone have both a high number of offenders
with 50 and 78 caught offenders, respectively, and a high average
sanction per offense ($181,000 and $168,000 US, respectively).
7For Buinea Bissau, 14 and 17 vessels were sanctioned in 2015 and 2016 (January to
August), respectively. However, given the lack of information on the nature of the
offense, it was not possible to fill in the gap in the fines using the Bissau Guinean
legislation. Multiple cases in 2004 illustrate that fines revolve around an average of
$151,611 US (Tribunal International De La Lois Pour La Mer., 2010).
In addition to high fines and a relatively high number of caught
offenders, Sierra Leone MCS detects and fines most categories of
offenses (in constraints to detecting the offenders themselves),
with the exception of prohibited species, which tends to be
merged in the last category, i.e., unspecified violation of fisheries
regulations, followed by Senegal (Figure 3).
Total Reconstructed Illegal Catches
Illegal catches, i.e., catches taken illegally by foreign fleets,
were overall constant at around an average of 690,000
t•year−1 between 2010 and 2015. Country estimates vary widely
(Figure 4). Illegal catches were the highest in Mauritania and
Senegal with 268,000 and 261,000 t•year−1 respectively, due
to the presence of Eastern European pelagic trawlers targeting
small-pelagic fish in high quantities (Figure 4). However,
improving success of MCS due to the availability of funding (The
World Bank, 2016), has prompted illegal catches to decline from
around 350,000 to 250,000 t•year−1 between 2010 and 2015 for
both countries. Illegal catches in Sierra Leone declined at first
from 10,000 t•year−1 in 2010 to less than 3,500 t•year−1 in 2014,
FIGURE 2 | Evolution of the number of caught offenders in West Africa
between 2009 and 2016, per EEZ.
FIGURE 1 | Total (thick line) and average (thin line) fine amounts in West Africa, 2009–2016.
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FIGURE 3 | Profile of fine and number of caught offenders by type of offense in Sierra Leone (purple), Senegal (green), Guinea (red), Guinea Bissau
(light blue), and The Gambia (dark blue), 2010–2016. The size of circles represents to the amount of the (average) fine for the offense by country.
FIGURE 4 | Reconstructed illegal catches from West Africa, 2010–2015. Note that the scale differs.
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after which they increased drastically due to the Ebola crisis,
to reach 35,000 t•year−1 in 2015 (Figure 4). Illegal catches in
Guinea increased from 40,000 t•year−1 in 2010 to over 150,000
t•year−1 in 2015 (Figure 4). Similarly, illegal catches in Guinea
Bissau increased from less than 20,000 t•year−1 in 2010 to over
60,000 t•year−1 in 2015 (Figure 4). Illegal catches in The Gambia
remained overall constant with slight variation, at 2,000 t•year−1
on average between 2010 and 2015 (Figure 4).
Economic Value of IUU Catches
IUU in the waters of west Africa induced, at least, a loss of $2.3
billion US annually, most of which is caused by illegal fishing,
or fishing without an authorization and under-reporting by fleets
that are otherwise authorized to fish in West Africa (Table 2).
IUU losses increased from $1.8 billion in 2010 (with $1.1 million
recovered through fines) to $2.2 billion in 2012 ($0.2 million
recovered through fines), decreased to $2 billion between 2013
($0.02 million USD recovered through fines) and 2014 ($8.5
million recovered through fines), after which they increased to
a maximum of $2.3 billion in 2015 (Table 2) during and after the
Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone and Guinea, and after the departure
of the World Bank and Environmental Justice Foundation from
Sierra Leone, whose programs were key in increased monitoring
in the country.
Overall, under-reporting alone contributed to a loss of value
of $2 billion over the period from 2010 to 2015, of which 30%
is contributed by East European countries and Russia, 20% by
Western European countries, which is at the same level than
China, and 9% by flag of convenience countries, and 21% by
unknown/unidentified countries. This illustrates that the lack of
monitoring also reflects upon fleets that are legally entitled to fish
in the waters of the West African sub-region. Over a period of 6
years, between 2010 and 2015, West African countries lost a total
of $ 24.6 billion US to IUU fishing, around half of which is taken
by vessels that are not authorized to operate in their waters.
Assessing the Effectiveness of MCS
Using a set of indicators allows to assessing the effectiveness
of MCS in West Africa within the regional standard of
capabilities. A similar analysis at the global level would warrant
a more effective assessment of MCS in the sub-region. This
assessment hence takes into account realities of the region,
such as governance, human and financial means, corruption,
etc. This aims at learning from regional trends lessons that are
realistically implementable within a limited means framework.
TABLE 2 | Loss induced by illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing in
West Africa, 2010–2015 in million $ US2015.
Year Illegal value Unreported value Unregulated value Total IUU
2010 1,459 376 0.1 1,836
2011 1,669 376 6.2 2,052
2012 1,608 543 4.6 2,155
2013 1,831 177 3.8 2,011
2014 1,704 285 11.4 2,000
2015 1,996 263 4.1 2,263
Total 10,267 2,020 30.2 12,317
Of a maximum score of 44, Sierra Leone scores 33.5, followed
by The Gambia with 24, Guinea with 23.3, Senegal with 22.7,
and Guinea Bissau with 13.4, respectively (Table 3). It appears
from this ranking that Sierra Leone’s MCS ranks first in the
region, despite an increased illegal catch during the Ebola crisis.
Senegal does not appear to be scoring the highest despite clear
efforts at the end of 2015 with the adoption of new historical fine
legislations, and a new Fisheries Act. The time series used here
may affect the scoring with most vessels being caught during a
relatively recent time period.
DISCUSSIONS
This study estimates that illegal fishing in West Africa is
responsible for a loss of over $2.3 billion US a year, of which
only $13.8 million US/year (2016 baseline) are recovered through
MCS. It also sheds light on the types of offenses that are prevalent
in the region and the sanctions therein, and through a cross
country comparison, illustrates gaps in monitoring. This gap is
further illustrated herein by the total economic loss generated by
IUU activities amounted 1.8 billion USD in 2010 (<0.1%), when
only 1.1 million USD were recovered through fines. The IUU
losses then increased to 2.3 billion USD in 2015, when 8.2 million
USD was recovered through fines (0.4%).
This study documents 230 observed offenses and ranks them
based on the most prevalent ones in the West African sub-
region. Over the 23 offense categories, 22 are committed by
vessels authorized to fish in the waters of Senegal, The Gambia,
Guinea Bissau, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. Under-reporting of the
fishing effort is the most prevalent offense, which remains mostly
unsanctioned. This offense relates to the fact that fishing fees
are paid, mainly, based on the total Gross Registered Tonnage
(GRT), and vessels from Asia were found under-reporting their
GRT (Greenpeace, 2016b) to reduce their fishing fees. This
offense alone could add another 520,000 $ of non-paid GRT
fees (Greenpeace, 2016b) to the loss incurred due to IUU
fishing. This study also finds that offenses that have a severe
impact on small-scale communities were also prevalent with
gear related offenses (catching juvenile and prohibited species
and fishing in prohibited zones such as artisanal areas). These
offense types rank second and third and were more likely to
be detected and sanctioned than other offenses. The presence
of non-governmental organizations working with small-scale
communities enhances the detection of such infractions (Sumaila
et al., 2006).
Illegal catches are based on a reconstruction method whose
uncertainty is discussed in previous analyses (Belhabib et al.,
2016). Over the $2.3 billion US lost to IUU, only $13.8 million
were recovered through MCS, in 2016. However, encouraging
signs illustrate that while the number of detected offenses
is increasing, the average sanction per offense is decreasing,
alongside with a change in the profile of offenses to less severe
offenses (according to national regulations). The rise of the Ebola
crisis has slowed down the ability of MCS units in Guinea
and Sierra Leone, and hence the total recovered fine, however,
this total continues to increase. By developing the first regional
database for offenses and sanctions, this study introduces the first
scoring system that ranks MCS in West Africa, by looking at the
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TABLE 3 | Scoring of the MCS system in West Africa8.
Country Amount (normalized by the
maximum average fine)
Number of Fined offenders
weighted by maximum in
Guinea (max = 5)
Categories
fined
log of catch value
per shelf km2
Availability of
information
Total score
Senegal 2.29 5.00 9 4.45 2 22.7
Gambia 5.00 5.00 5 5.00 4 24.0
Guinea Bissau 1.03 3.25 3 4.15 2 13.4
Guinea 0.30 3.47 12 3.56 4 23.3
Sierra Leone 2.08 5.00 17 3.43 6 33.5
fine amounts, the number of detected offenders, the categories
of offenses that are effectively fined, the illegal catch value and
the transparency of the information system, which could be
reproduced in other regions of the world, and could be adjusted
for data availability. Scoring analysis indicates that despite the
Ebola crisis, Sierra Leone was the most effective in detecting
and sanctioning (with considerably higher fines) illegal fishing
both in number and amounts. This is, however, to be taken with
caution, as data on the number of offenses relative to the number
of operating vessels were not available at the time of this study.
Further, such database could serve as a benchmark for fining and
sanctioning, particularly with repeat offenders. Examples show
that when information with regards to previous offenses by a
vessel is available, the fine is inflated, which is in the advantage
of the fining country9,10.
Illegal catches decreased in Senegal, Mauritania, and Guinea
Bissau and increased by 3-fold in Guinea and by 4-fold in
Sierra Leone, due mainly to the Ebola crisis, and despite drastic
measures such as red cards emitted by the EU. In addition, the
suspension of the West Africa Regional Fisheries Programme
funded by theWorld Bank which assuredmajor funding forMCS
activities, and Environmental Justice Foundation, which played
a major role in both training and enhancing MCS capabilities
in Sierra Leone, prompted a major increase in illegal catches in
the country. These increases drive the trend of illegal fishing
upwards, and hence the value from $1.8 billion in 2010 to $2.3
billion in 2015, which cumulates to $12.3 billion during the
same time period. Vessels legally operating in the region are
under-reporting the equivalent of 13% of this value.
Overall, the results of this study show that countries of
West Africa are vulnerable to IUU fishing, which is not news.
The contrast in MCS capacity between Mauritania (Beibou,
2015) and Senegal in the north and Guinea to Sierra Leone
in south is evident through the trends in illegal catches.
However, Sierra Leone scoring highest for MCS is an indicator
that—in the absence of major constraints such as Ebola-,
encouraging signs of increased efforts to combat illegal fishing
are shown. Even though all these countries are part of the
Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission which has joint surveillance
capabilities, investment in MCS has been much higher in the
8Due to the absence of information the Mauritanian MSC was nor considered
in this analysis. We note however that this study was done after Mauritania
joined the Fisheries Transparency Initiative and hope that similar analysis could
be performed for Mauritania in the near future.
9http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25621864
10http://researcherdiaries.com/2016/07/busted-the-gotland-to-pay-1-5-million-
euros-in-fines-to-the-government-of-senegal/
northern countries whose wide continental shelves and rich
waters are more targeted by illegal fishing fleets, than in the
south. This study further reveals that most detected offenses
escaping sanctions occurs in countries such as Guinea and
Guinea Bissau, where the rate of sanction is very low. Hence,
it calls for the implementation of regional measures such as
the right of pursuit which allows an offended country to
pursuit the illegal fishing boat and to catch it in the EEZ
of its neighboring country. Other efforts post-detection of
offense should also be used, such as AIS tracing of vessel
activities, as a proof of infringement in court, increased
fines to disincentivize illegal fishing, and increased regional
cooperation.
This study also finds that IUU fishing poses a serious threat
to populations dependent on fish stocks and to the very safety
of artisanal fishers. Among the most common infractions are
incursions by trawlers into the zones reserved for artisanal
fishers and these tend to occur at night, regularly causing fishers
to lose their fishing gear and canoes, and has even resulted
in the loss of lives (Doumbouya et al., 2004). In addition,
recent analysis indicate that tackling illegal fishing in the region
may result in regaining back 300,000 jobs (Daniels et al.,
2016).
This analysis shows an important gap between the value of
the loss generated by IUU fishing and the amount IUU vessels
are effectively fined. It also shows that higher fines contribute
into reducing incentives of illegal fishing through a higher
capability of catching offenders (increased resources for MCS),
and providing higher incentives to avoid being caught. This study
recommends, beyond addressing the lack of human and financial
resources for MCS efforts:
• Increased sanctions against e.g., repeat offenders and foreign
illegal fishing: This can be done through strengthening the
legal system.
Indeed, this study further illustrates that this legal framework
exists in some countries of the sub-region, and whenever possible
is applied appropriately. Both Guinea and Senegal’s new Fisheries
Acts inflict historically high sanctions for illegal fishing (Daniels
et al., 2016).
• Issues of transparency, low governance and high corruption,
and hence effective prosecution need to be addressed in the
region: This region of the world is particularly targeted by
major external funding for its MCS operations (The World
Bank, 2016), capacity is focused on building theMCS network,
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while prosecution for higher fines, or the legislative system that
allows for appropriate sanctions may be weak.
Perpetuating lower sanctions and fines makes MCS vulnerable
to the availability of funding through external party
contributions.
• It is hence very important to use low cost tools such
as Automatic Identification System and Vessel Monitoring
Systems for effective monitoring, to implement pre-existing
legislations, such as the regional right of pursuit that allows
countries to either follow or follow up on illegal fishing
vessels regionally as illegal fishing takes a form of transnational
activity and does not respect national boundaries.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
AD, OC, and DB gathered, analyzed and interpreted data,
discussed the results and co-wrote the manuscript. EB and
AP edited the manuscript and discussed the results, JM,
JI, SC, AJ, AG, and DN gathered data and discussed the
results.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study is a contribution of West African fisheries specialists
who participated in aWest Africa capacity BuildingWorkshop at
the University of British Columbia Institute for the Oceans (IOF)
and Fisheries, and the Sea Around Us toward the project “Marine
Conservation Research, Collaboration and Support in West
Africa”, funded by the MAVA Foundation. The Sea Around Us
is a scientific collaboration at the University of British Columbia
funded by the Paul G. Allen Family Foundation. The authors
thank the IOF staff, faculty and students for their hospitality
during the workshop, and colleagues in West Africa for the
valued information.
REFERENCES
Anon, (2015). Strategy and National Action Plan for the Biodiversity. Bissau: The
Republic of Guinea Bissau; The State’s General Office of the Environment.
Agnew, D. J., Pearce, J., Pramod, G., Peatman, T., Watson, R., Beddington, J. R.,
et al. (2009). Estimating the worldwide extent of illegal fishing. PLoS ONE
4:e4570. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0004570
Andrews-Chouicha, E., and Gray, K. (2005). Why Fish Piracy Persists: the
Economics of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing. Paris: Organization
for Economic.
Beibou, E. (2015). Géomatique collaborative: mise en œuvre d’un système
d’information pour la pêche responsable en Mauritanie. Nouadhibou: Imrop.
Belhabib, D., Copeland, D., Gorez, B., Harper, S., and Zeller, D. (2012a). “Guinean
fisheries: past, present and future,” in Marine Fisheries Catches in West Africa,
eds D. Belhabib, S. Harper, D. Zeller, and D. Pauly (Vancouver, BC), 91–104.
Belhabib, D., Gascuel, D., Abou Kane, E., Harper, S., Zeller, D., and Pauly,
D. (2012b). “Preliminary estimation of realistic fisheries removals from
Mauritania: 1950–2010,” inMarine Fisheries Catches in West Africa, Part 1, eds
D. Belhabib, D. Zeller, S. Harper, and D. Pauly (Vancouver, BC), 61–78.
Belhabib, D., Harper, S., Zeller, D., and Pauly, D. (eds.). (2012c). Marine Fisheries
Catches in West Africa, 1950-2010, Part I. Vancouver, BC.
Belhabib, D., Koutob, V., Lazar, N., Ndiaye, V., Tobey, J., Mathews, C., et al.
(2014a). Beyond the Unseen: A First Collaborative Model Towards Estimating
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Catches off Senegal. Fisheries Centre
Working Papers, Vancouver: University of British Columbia.
Belhabib, D., Koutob, V., Sall, A., Lam, V. W., and Pauly, D. (2014b). Fisheries
catchmisreporting and its implications: the case of Senegal. Fish. Res. 151, 1–11.
doi: 10.1016/j.fishres.2013.12.006
Belhabib, D., Koutob, V., Sall, A., Lam, V. W., Zeller, D., and Pauly, D. (2015a).
Counting pirogues and missing the boat: reply to Chaboud et al.’s comment
on Belhabib et al.“Fisheries catch misreporting and its implications: the case of
Senegal”. Fish. Res. 164, 325–328. doi: 10.1016/j.fishres.2014.09.016
Belhabib, D., Mendy, A., Subah, Y., Broh, N. T., Jueseah, A. S., Nipey, N., et al.
(2016). Fisheries catch under-reporting in The Gambia, Liberia and Namibia
and the three large marine ecosystems which they represent. Environ. Dev. 17,
157–174. doi: 10.1016/j.envdev.2015.08.004
Belhabib, D., and Pauly, D. (eds.). (2015).Marine Fisheries Catches in West Africa,
1950-2010, Part II. Vancouver, BC.
Belhabib, D., Sumaila, U. R., Lam, V. W., Zeller, D., Le Billon, P., Kane, E. A., et al.
(2015b). Euros vs. Yuan: comparing European and Chinese fishing access inWest
Africa. PLoS ONE 10:e0118351. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0118351
Belhabib, D., Sumaila, U. R., and Pauly, D. (2015c). Feeding the poor: contribution
of West African fisheries to employment and food security. Ocean Coast.
Manage. 111, 72–81. doi: 10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2015.04.010
Caopa, and Rejprao, (2016). Voices from African Artisanal Fisheries. Calling for an
African Year of Artisanal Fisheries. Dakar: CAOPA.
Daniels, A., Gutierrez, M., Fanjul, G., Guerena, A., Matheson, I., and Watkins,
K. (2016). Western Africa’s Missing Fish. The Impacts of Iunreported and
Unregulated Fishing and Under-Reporting Catches by Foreign Fleets. London:
Overseas Development Institute.
Doumbouya, A., Guilavogui, A., and Lefur, J. (2004). Accès à l’Espace et
à la Ressource: Compétition et Conflits entre la Pêche Artisanale et la
Pêche Industrielle Dans la ZEE Guinéenne. Conakry: Document Scientifique;
CNSHB.
Environmental Justice Foundation (2012). Pirate Fishing Exposed. The Fight
Against Illegal Fishing in West Africa and the EU. London: Environmental
Justice Foundation.
FAO (2016). The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Contributing
to Food Security and Nutrition for All. Rome: Food and Agriculture
Organisaton.
Finch, R. (2016). The Evil Empire.How Common Fisheries Policy is Recolonising the
Third World. Brussels: Europe of Freedon and Direct Democracy.
Greenpeace (2006).Witnessing the Plunder. How Illegal Fishing from West African
Waters finds its way to the EU Ports and Markets. London: Greenpeace.
Greenpeace (2016a). Africa’s Fisheries’ Paradise ar a Crossroads. Investigating
Chinese Companies’ Illegal Fishing Practices in West Africa. Dakar:
Greenpeace.
Greenpeace (2016b). Scam on the African Coast. Dakar:
Greenpeace.
INTERPOL (2014). Study on Fisheries Crime in the West African Coastal Region.
Lyon: INTERPOL.
Le Gallic, B., and Cox, A. (2006). An economic analysis of illegal, unreported and
unregulated (IUU) fishing: key drivers and possible solutions. Mar. Policy 30,
689–695. doi: 10.1016/j.marpol.2005.09.008
MRAG (2005). Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on
Developing Countries. London: MRAG.
NOAA (2015). Improving International Fisheries Management. Report to Congress
persuant to section 403(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Reauthorization Act of 2006. Washington, DC.
Pauly, D., Belhabib, D., Blomeyer, R., Cheung, W. W., Cisneros-Montemayor,
A. M., Copeland, D., et al. (2014). China’s distant-water fisheries in the 21st
century. Fish Fish. 15, 474–488. doi: 10.1111/faf.12032
Seto, K., Belhabib, D., Copeland, D., Vakily, M., Seilert, H., Sankoh, S., et al. (2015).
Colonialism, Conflict, and Fish: A Reconstruction of Marine Fisheries Catches
Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org 9 March 2017 | Volume 4 | Article 50
Doumbouya et al. Offenses and Sanctions against IUU in West Africa
for Sierra Leone, 1950-2010. Vancouver, BC: Fisheries Centre Working Paper,
University of British Columbia.
Standing, A. (2006). Corruption and Commercial Fisheries in Africa. U4Brief. Cape
Town: Chr. Michelsen Institute.
Sumaila, U. R., Alder, J., andKeith, H. (2006). Global scope and economics of illegal
fishing.Mar. Policy 30, 696–703. doi: 10.1016/j.marpol.2005.11.001
Swartz,W., Sumaila, R., andWatson, R. (2013). Global ex-vessel fish price database
revisited: a new approach for estimating ’missing’prices. Environ. Resour. Econ.
56, 467–480. doi: 10.1007/s10640-012-9611-1
The World Bank (2016). West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (P106063).
Implementation Status and Results Report. TheWorld Bank, Washington, DC.
Tribunal International De La Lois Pour La Mer. (2010). Pleadings, Minutes of
Public Sittings and Documents. Volume 12 = Mémoires, Procès-Verbaux Des
Audiences Publiques et Documents. Leiden; Biggleswade: Martinus Nijhoff;
Extenza Turpin [distributor]
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Doumbouya, Camara, Mamie, Intchama, Jarra, Ceesay, Guèye,
Ndiaye, Beibou, Padilla and Belhabib. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org 10 March 2017 | Volume 4 | Article 50
